



Federal Public Service
Justice

Action Plan

*against radicalization
in prisons*

11th March 2015

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General approach

The government has made a priority of tackling radicalization in prisons. The attacks in Paris in December 2014, the attack against the Jewish museum in Brussels earlier that year, the planned terrorist actions that were thwarted in Verviers in early January 2015 and the attacks in Copenhagen illustrate the importance of a thorough approach to radicalism and terrorism. The need for an adapted detention policy is an integral part of that approach.

It is hardly news that prisons are a potential breeding ground for radicalization and recruitment. Ideologically and religiously inspired groups try to develop their networks in prisons via detainees. Currently, radicalization is mainly of religious nature and religion is used to justify violence.

Detainees form a group that is particularly susceptible to radicalization and that deserves specific attention and follow-up. Potential recruits are often imprisoned for minor offences, but their frustrations with society, peer pressure, the isolation from 'normal' society, the search for a religiously or ideologically inspired meaning in life and/or the desire to belong to a group makes them especially susceptible to radical thinking, which has turned against the fundamental values and rights of our society.

In order to prevent that, more and more European countries are taking measures against recruitment and radicalization in penitentiary institutions.

There is a lot of discussion on what is the best solution to counter radicalization processes: isolation by means of concentration, which means that the radicalized individuals are completely separated from the other detainees in order to prevent further contamination, or isolation by dispersing the radicalized individuals among the other detainees in order to prevent further nourishment of their ideological ideas.

International insights in this field are useful, but at the same time, it is difficult to compare the Belgian situation with the situation in other countries, given the many differences between detention systems and prison populations. Hence, there is a need for a policy that is specifically adapted to the Belgian situation and to the scale of the issue.

The policy on radicalization and the approach of the issue should also be coherent with the existing policy and on-going projects. The **central objective** of the policy is twofold and consists of, on the one hand preventing the radicalization of detainees during their imprisonment and, on the other hand developing a specialized follow-up of radicalized people during their detention.

Striving for:

- > better living conditions in the penitentiary institutions;
- > a stronger information position;
- > efficient consultation and coordination structures;
- > the digitization and automation of the flow of information;
- > a better detection of radicalization;
- > a well-considered placement policy;
- > an individualized approach when necessary;
- > the systematic involvement of the representatives of the various religions;
- > de-radicalization and disengagement programmes; and
- > reinforced cooperation with the local level, the federated states and Europe.

should make the detainees more resilient to the influences of extremist ideas within the prison walls and should ensure a strong and decisive follow-up of radicalized individuals.

In the context of the implementation of this action plan, the Federal Public Service Justice will also enter into close consultation with the federated states and their respective administrative departments established in the prisons, in order to discuss in which way they can contribute to the fight against radicalization.

It will also be examined whether the basic law concerning the prison system should be reformed in view of this new challenge, especially as regards placement, visiting regulations, correspondence, cell searches, etc.

Implementation

Within the general direction Penitentiary Institutions (GD PI), a unit 'Extremism' has been established, which will further develop this action plan and coordinate its implementation. The unit consists of three collaborators of the GD PI who have specific competences in the field. It is also directed by the regional directions North and South.

After further research and consultation of experts, the unit will formulate proposals regarding the required infrastructure, the regime to be developed, the level of supervision over internal and external contacts, the required competences of the staff and the necessity of any additional security measures.

Moreover, that unit will also ensure the central direction of the coordinators, gather knowledge and stimulate the exchange of information. The unit can also make recommendations on security measures and the security regime to the local and regional directions (article 110 and following of the Basic Law).

Ten points of action

Better living conditions in the penitentiary institutions

The most powerful weapon in the fight against radicalization in prisons is without a doubt a humane detention policy that respects the fundamental rights of the detainees and focuses indefatigably on rehabilitation and reintegration. Therefore, a custodial sentence or measure has to be executed under psychosocial, physical and material conditions that respect the dignity of the human person, has to render the preservation or growth of the self-respect of the detainee possible and has to appeal to their individual and social responsibility (cf. article 5 of the Basic Law).

In spite of a stabilization of the prison population in 2013 and a slight decrease in 2014, the Belgian prisons continue to struggle with overpopulation. That has had its effects on the living conditions of the detainees. The Masterplan, together with a series of other measures aimed at pushing back the custodial sentence in favour of other sentences, will try to remedy the current situation so detainees can serve their detention under better conditions in the future. The Justice Plan will clarify that approach in more detail, both for the category of the sentenced persons, the persons in pre-trial detention and the confined persons.

Tackling the overpopulation and improving the well-being of the detainees through, among other things, better detention conditions and a better infrastructure will contribute to the creation of a climate in which the detainees are less susceptible to radicalization. In other words, more attention for the well-being of the detainees is the foundation on which all other measures in the fight against radicalization will be grafted.

A stronger information position by a more goal-oriented information gathering and analysis

Just as with the broader approach to radicalization, the gathering of information with a view to tackling the radicalization in prisons is of great importance. Due to the specific circumstances characteristic of prisons, the access to that information is far from simple. To date, the intelligence and security services only have a limited operational coverage for radicalization in Belgian prisons. To improve that situation, a number of very specific efforts will have to be made.

The State Security Service has created a division within the service that is specifically targeted at the issue of radicalization in the Belgian prisons. The staff members concerned will be trained during the first trimester of 2015. The division will be operational from the second trimester onwards and the first elements of information will be gathered. In the third trimester, contacts will be made between the provincial posts and the local directions of the prison system and, in the fourth trimester, the first results will be presented in the form of an analysis of the phenomenon of radicalization.

While gathering the information, there has to be close cooperation between the intelligence and security services, the judicial authorities and the GD Penitentiary Institutions. The State Security Service will pay particular attention to the radicalizing influences from outside, such as the interference of foreign powers in the Belgian prisons.

In addition to the intelligence and security services, the staff of the penitentiary institutions plays an important role. Through their daily contact with the detainees, they are in the perfect position to recognize and draw attention to indications of radicalization in good time. That assumes, of course, that the staff receives the necessary training to do that. That aspect will be discussed in the part about training.

In addition, the State Security Service will aim for a **better exploitation and analysis of the information gathered**. The service has the following action points in mind:

- > a yearly analysis of the phenomenon of radicalization in Belgian prisons, ideally accompanied by a number of specific recommendations. That analysis can be widely disseminated and is meant to raise awareness of the issue with the partners;
- > a monthly overview on the findings concerning radicalization within the prison walls for the benefit of the GD Penitentiary Institutions and the Minister of Justice;
- > that overview will also be discussed in the permanent discussion platform;
- > the formulation of a detailed fact sheet per terror detainee in collaboration with the CUTA and the Federal Police (Central Direction for the fight against serious and organized crime) for the benefit of the GD Penitentiary Institutions. After all, the GD Penitentiary Institutions needs to quickly assess new detainees to determine the detention regime;
- > punctual information to Belgian partners both upon request and on their own initiative;
- > a yearly overview concerning the subject matter for foreign partners with a view to obtaining useful information about their findings on and approach to radicalization in prisons. It can lead to a meaningful exchange concerning practices, methods and theories.

Efficient consultation and coordination structures for an optimal information exchange

Apart from the gathering and analysis of information, the exchange of information between the various partners is also important. A smooth circulation of information via efficient consultation and coordination structures is crucial in the framework of a proactive and reactive approach.

Currently, the exchange of information regarding radicalization in prisons occurs via **a permanent discussion platform**, established in the framework of the protocol of agreement between the State Security Service and the GD PI (concluded on 20 November 2006). That protocol of agreement was concluded in November 2006 in the framework of the federal action plan Radicalism (Plan R). Representatives of the CUTA, the crisis centre and the central services Terrorism of the federal police also participate in the permanent discussion platform. The platform aims for an optimization of the gathering and exchange of information, both on the level of the phenomenon and on the level of intelligence concerning people who need special attention. The cooperation has increased significantly in the past few months. Currently, there are monthly meetings and **the circulation of information between all partners has increased significantly**, which offers new possibilities for the future. Those possibilities will be further specified and developed in 2015.

Currently, the **federal prosecutor's office** does not participate in the permanent discussion platform, though a possible participation or consultation in any other form will be discussed with the federal public prosecutor in the following weeks.

In addition, **coordinators** will be appointed within the GD PI and will be directed centrally by the cell extremism. They will act as contact point for the local continued training of the staff, the gathering and exchange of information, the contacts with the local divisions of the security services, the support of the direction and psychosocial service, and as a contact point for the representatives of the federated states in the development of an adjusted offer of assistance and services. All of the coordinators will be active in one or more institutions. When necessary, institutions will be clustered, such that each institution can count on the support of a coordinator. They will start work as soon as possible and at the latest on 1 June 2015 so that the coordinators are operational by December 2015.

Digitization and automation of the circulation of information

Digitization of the circulation of information and an automatic connection between existing databases is of great importance.

Satisfying the current regulations regarding the circulation of information from the prison system to other partners involves quite some administrative work. It still happens too often via paper work, which is not only very labour-intensive, but also enables human errors. The aim is to **optimize and digitize a number of data streams where possible**.

Recently, a great step forward was achieved with the implementation of new software, SIDIS Suite, through which the **complete digital files of detainees** are now available. That enables a digital, faster and more complete data exchange between the prison system, the public prosecutor's office, the file managers who manage the electronic monitoring in the community justice centres, and the federal and local police services.

Priority will be given **to connecting the databases of the prisons with those of the federal police**. That information exchange will be of great importance for the follow-up of radicalized detainees who have been released under electronic monitoring or under other measures. Currently, the police have access to SIDIS Suite, but not through an automated connection. On short term an automatic connection will be realized between SIDIS Suite and the National General Database. Meanwhile, for detainees who are granted electronic monitoring, the police of their residence will be informed per fax/e-mail. There is a lead time of three months for a further optimization. Everything has to be operational no later than the end of 2015.

The State Security Service, which also has access to SIDIS Suite, will place it at the disposal of its diverse provincial posts. For the staff there, the State Security Service will develop an adjusted training based on previous trainings by the GD PI from February 2015 onwards. The State Security Service will also verify in which way it can improve the connection between SIDIS Suite and its own database.

Furthermore, they will also verify whether additional adjustments and functional extensions to SIDIS Suite and the application Siset (electronic monitoring), such as the integration of the terror register in SIDIS Suite, are necessary and which information might be registered additionally.

The GD PI will also gain access to the Belgian Intelligence Network Information Infrastructure (BINI), an existing secure network between police, intelligence and security services, to facilitate the exchange of classified information.

Raising awareness and basic training with a view to a better detection

The training of the staff is not only of the utmost importance on the level of detection of radicalization, but also on the level of a suitable contact with and supervision of radicalized detainees.


In the past, the State Security Service has organized an awareness-raising course concerning the issue of radicalization for all penitentiary institutions. A total of almost 150 persons followed that course. They were mostly prison wardens, members of the higher surveillance management and staff of the psychosocial services. In addition, the State Security Service has also organized specific training for prison administrations and staff of the training institutes (according to the principle “train the trainers”).

However, the Federal Public Service Justice will **make additional efforts for the training of the staff**. The objective is to increase the observation potential and to detect problems in good time.

The theme of radicalization in detention will be **integrated in the basic training** given to all staff members who enter into service (all ranks and positions) via a module similar to a training based on the COPPRA (Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalisation). The COPPRA training was initially developed for local police officers, but it offers some guidelines that might be useful for the staff in the penitentiary institutions. Those guidelines can help the staff with the identification of radicalization of detainees.

There is sufficient internal expertise within the GD PI and the federal police to develop that training tool by the end of June. The training has to offer guidelines, which the staff can use at work. The objective is to raise awareness in the staff for possible problems, but also to avoid panic behaviour and to install an efficient circulation of information regarding radicalization in prisons. That training has to allow, for example, to make a distinction between an orthodox religious practice and radicalization.

Furthermore, staff that has already been working there for a longer period, has to acquire the same basic knowledge concerning radicalization. In order to reach those persons as well, the FPS opted to compile and offer an adjusted e-learning module. Such training can be given at the local level and does not need much organization. For the development of such a module, the input and technical assistance of external experts will be necessary. The e-learning module should be ready by January 2016.



In addition, several information sessions will be organized. There will be an information session for all **members of the psychosocial service**, which will focus on the identification training and the tackling of radicalization. For **the management staff**, an information session will be organized concerning the procedures the psychosocial service will use during the selection of radicalized detainees who will be placed in specialized sections (see infra). Both information sessions will be organized this year.

Finally, the GD PI has submitted a project proposal “Training” with the European Commission in the framework of the Internal Security Fund. If the project is approved, additional resources will be used for the training of staff from September 2015 onwards. Those resources will be mainly used for the development of better training for the staff of specialized sections.

A well-considered placement policy based on a judicious selection

The incarceration of radicalized detainees is based on a **two-step strategy**. Concretely, this means that a choice has been made to not systematically concentrate radicalized detainees. Initially those **detainees will be placed in the normal sections as much as possible**; inasmuch as it is considered that the radicalization process can be controlled.

When that is impossible and when the detainee presents a serious (active or passive) radicalization risk and/or when they engage or continue to engage in an armed struggle on ideological grounds, **they can be transferred to a section in which specialized follow-up will be provided**.


Bearing in mind that infrastructural works have to be carried out and that this has a budgetary impact, the opening of a section in Bruges (16 places) and in Ittre (26 places) can be expected in 2015. Those sections require the least investments and, consequently, it will be possible to put them into service in December 2015.

They should certainly not be perceived as additional 'high security' sections, but as sections with staff that is specialized in dealing with the radicalization problem and in which adequate follow-up can be provided. However, the current human resources are insufficient, which means that extra staff will have to be recruited. The selection and training will start as of June 2015. It should be noted that the detainees concerned can of course also be placed under an individual special security regime, however only when the condition of article 116 of the Basic Law is fulfilled, i.e. when they pose a permanent threat to the internal and external security (cf. below).

By removing the most radicalized detainees from the prisons in which no specialized follow-up can be provided, the risk of recruitment and spreading of radical ideas as well as the risk of entanglement between ideologically inspired radical networks and 'regular' criminal networks is reduced.

The transfer of detainees to prisons providing specialized follow-up will be decided on the basis of an individualized evaluation and will be subject to a specific assessment. That implies that the necessary expertise has to be available in view of the selection of the detainees who pose an actual risk as regards recruitment and the spreading of radical ideas.

The files of the detainees who, according to the local psychosocial service, the local and regional directions and/or the security services, pose a radicalization risk, will be handed over to the central psychosocial service. Upon consultation with the local direction and the security services, the central psychosocial service will decide whether specialized follow-up is necessary. A special training will be provided for the staff of the central psychosocial service (cf. below). That approach will also require additional resources, as the tools that the psychosocial service currently uses for risk assessment are inadequate with regard to radicalization and violent extremism. Consequently, new tools (including training) will have to be acquired and/or developed by September 2015.



It is the regional direction that will take the final decision on the transfer. Further observation and orientation will take place in the specialized section. In consultation with the central psychosocial service and the security services, the local direction will formulate an advice regarding the further detention in a specialized section in case of a serious (active or passive) radicalization risk and/or engagement in armed struggle on religious and/or ideological grounds or regarding the re-integration in a normal section.

This two-step strategy in which radicalized detainees are not systematically concentrated should somewhat reduce the side effects of concentrated detention. 'Side effects' are the risk that radicalized detainees who are placed together in the same section can get to know each other better and confirm each other in their common radical ideas. That may lead to casual prison relations developing into close, organized networks that do not only share radical ideas but may also threaten the order and security within and outside the penitentiary institution.

Finally, it is important to note that a clear distinction should be made between the so-called 'terror detainees' and detainees who pose a serious risk of active and/or passive radicalization. Neither the first nor the second category poses a security problem a priori. However, those who are suspected of or convicted for terrorist activities often are evaluated as detainees with a high-risk profile as regards the internal as well as the external security. They are transferred to the secured sections if necessary. As soon as the security risk is acceptable again, those detainees are transferred back to the regular prisons.

In the prisons of Bruges and Ittre, the infrastructure is already being adapted and other infrastructural works have been planned.

Within the GD PI, a project has been launched for the development of a Risk Needs Assessment for detainees, from the start of their incarceration until their release. That information has to be translated into a detention plan aimed at guaranteeing security and re-integration.

Specialized follow-up in view of an individualized approach

In addition to the “Raising awareness and basic training with a view to a better detection” (cf. action point 5), a **specific training for the staff of the specialized sections** will also be provided for by December 2015.

The specific training for the **surveillance staff** (penitentiary surveillance assistants, shift managers, penitentiary assistants) will consist of intensive practice sessions, with special attention to conflict management and avoidance, the do’s and don’ts and the sensibilities of that group of detainees. The training should also enable the penitentiary surveillance assistants to draw up observation reports for the benefit of the psychosocial service and the direction.

A specific training for the **staff of the local and central psychosocial service** and the direction will be provided. That training should enable them: a) to recognize problematic situations concerning radicalization and violent extremism, to handle those situations in the best possible way and to report on them, b) to draw up observation reports for the benefit of the regional direction and the security services, c) to supply information allowing the regional direction to develop an adapted detention trajectory, and d) to draw up an adapted rehabilitation plan.

The candidates for employment in the specialized sections have to be screened and have to obtain a security certificate as mentioned in the law on security classification, security clearance, security certificates and security advisory notices. It is indeed important that security and recruitment risks, also among the staff, are prevented or reduced to a minimum.

Systematic involvement of the representatives of the various religions

Freedom of religion is one of the cornerstones of our democracy. That freedom has to be guaranteed in our prisons. However, it is a fact that religious practice has to be more contextualized in the penitentiary institutions in view of the risk of radicalization and, in particular, religiously inspired radicalization.

For that reason, the Belgian prisons strive for **an open and constructive relationship with the representatives of the recognized religions**. Their work in the prison is mainly focused on individual contact and assistance upon request, and the organization of the collective services. In the first place, they offer social support and advice, and they lend an ear to individual prisoners. Through those means, they can (in)directly contribute to the fight against radicalization in prisons.

As the cases of ideologically inspired radicalization are often rooted in radical interpretations of the Islam, **the Islam counsellors play a crucial role**. Islam counsellors are recommended to the Minister of Justice by the Muslim Executive of Belgium (MEB) after they (1) have taken an exam before the theological council of the MEB; (2) have signed a charter in which they vow to respect the laws of the Belgian people; (3) have familiarized themselves with the rules of procedure of the GD Penitentiary Institutions. Moreover, they are screened by the State Security Service, after which they can be appointed. The GD PI will be asked, as for any staff member of the penitentiary institutions, to advise the Minister whether candidates are fit to function in a penitentiary context.

It will also be verified whether it is also necessary to draft a type of statute in which their rights and duties are established.

Currently, there are 19 Islam counsellors that together fill in an establishment plan of 17.15 on 18 full-time equivalents. The first phase will be an attempt to fully staff the existing establishment plan. Next, the establishment plan of Islam counsellors will be increased from 18 to 27 FTE by December 2015. That requires not only additional resources, but also an adaptation of the Royal Decree concerned. Furthermore, the goal is a greater valorization of their work by making their post more attractive with regard to statute and wages.

In addition, the MEB will be encouraged to motivate more voluntary Islam counsellors. After all, there are only 8 voluntary Islam counsellors on a total of 130 voluntary moral/religious counsellors.

It is not only a striving for more Islam counsellors, but for well-educated counsellors as well. Though the post of counsellor requires a broad knowledge of both theological subjects and people skills, most counsellors have had little training. The training the MEB organizes for the Islam counsellors and the exam they need to take before they can enter into service as an Islam counsellor do not seem to suffice. However, the post of Islam counsellor requires a specific, broad training and continuous refresher courses that are not available today.

The goal is an improvement of the quality of the recruitment and the training in close cooperation with the MEB and with a thorough support of the MEB. A decent functional knowledge of one of the national languages is a basic condition and it will be ensured that the Islam counsellors have the necessary experience. Moreover, in consultation with the MEB, the activities of the Islam counsellors who are currently in service will be evaluated. The GD PI will advise the MEB during the recruitment of new Islam counsellors and provide the necessary support during the training.

In the long run, the requirement of a degree in Islamic theology has to be introduced for all Islam counsellors. It is self-evident that the communities will play an important role, among other things, by encouraging Dutch-speaking and French-speaking universities to offer such training.

Immediately after recruitment, the training of the GD PI has to familiarize the Islam counsellors with the rules of procedure in the prisons, but some of the internal trainings concerning radicalization for the PI staff have to be open to the Islam counsellors as well. An important point of interest is the Islam counsellors' signalling of problems concerning radicalization to the local direction and the coordinators. Currently, Islam counsellors do signal problems to the prison authorities informally, but there is no form of official reporting. The GD PI will consult on this with the MEB, as well as the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking coordinators of the Islam counsellors.

In the future, the Islam counsellors will be systematically involved in projects concerning the prevention of radicalization and the de-radicalization within the prisons. For this, workshops can be organized with the various interested partners and, possibly, foreign experts. Islam counsellors can also play a useful role in the transition to freedom. They can form a bridge between the penitentiary institutions, the family and the imam of the local community.

It is, however, important to note that Islam counsellors do not have a monopoly on the introduction of religious knowledge and that other sources can have an impact on the prisoners. Therefore, measures need to be taken to limit radical influences from the outside by a stricter control of literature, visitors, post, etc.

The local level and the local network are already familiar with that issue and can be involved.

De-radicalization and disengagement programmes

Prisons can be a potential breeding ground for radicalization, but they can also offer a setting in which detainees can gain different insights. Programmes that strive for de-radicalization (changing the radicalized person's mind) or at least disengagement (which boils down to changing the person's behaviour) have to be developed.

Though there is still discussion about the approach of the disengagement and de-radicalization programmes – namely individual versus group approach, on voluntary or compulsory basis, importance of an ideological counter message, etc. –, there is already a lot of expertise available in a number of European and non-European countries.

In Belgium, disengagement policy is still in its infancy; however, it is inadvisable to wait with its development until sufficient national scientific research is available. **The necessary expertise is already available in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and Spain:** four countries that have been confronted with the issue of radicalized prisoners much earlier and have years of experience with that issue.

In the meanwhile, several internationally renowned experts from those countries have been contacted. Afterwards, it will be determined which elements of the foreign approach are also applicable in Belgium and the communities can set up an experiment in collaboration with the GD PI.

The purpose of that project, which could start from May 2015 onwards, would be to offer a training package concerning de-radicalization and disengagement for the benefit of the key staff who has to work with those ideologically radicalized prisoners, both in the specialized sections and the ordinary sections. Ideally, that training package will be open to the representatives of the religions with a crucial role for the Islam counsellors.

That training package will offer a sophisticated, individual-oriented methodology that has to support the staff in their work towards disengagement/de-radicalization and will contain the following elements:

- > identifying the degree of radicalization of the prisoner;
- > offering appropriate ways to initiate the dialogue with those prisoners;
- > learning the difference between religious behaviour and culturally determined practices;
- > learning the appropriate conversation techniques and methods that can help to make the prisoner susceptible to alternative points of view;
- > offering arguments that can be used in the dialogue with the prisoners;
- > offering answers to the most frequent questions and needs of the staff and the prisoners.
- >
- > For this, experts will be involved whose expertise has proven its utility in practice and whose techniques are founded on insights from psychology, pedagogy and theology.

Reinforced cooperation with the local level, the federated states and Europe

The cooperation between the GD PI, in particular the psychosocial service, and the **prevention officials of the cities and communes** has to be developed. It is important to carefully prepare the detainees for the transition from prison to society and to ensure that they can build a new existence and social network in order to avoid recidivism and a return to extremism.

There will also be a strong focus on more collaboration with the federated states for the matters for which they are also competent within the prison walls, such as education, culture, welfare and such. By offering the radicalized detainees a perspective on re-integration, for instance via training, a contribution to their personal development can be made and their possibilities to peacefully and successfully re-integrate in society after detention can be increased.

A particular point of interest is the collaboration with assistants of justice who are responsible for the follow-up of judicial alternative measures and who can also be confronted with radicalized individuals. Active involvement of the services under the competence of the federated states that are present in the prison will not only contribute to the prevention of radicalization, but also to putting a halt to or reversing the radicalization process. Here too, the exchange of information is a key factor. It will be verified in which way the representatives of the communities can be involved in the consultation and coordination structures.

The difference in the organization of the assistance and services in the communities involved is a great challenge, but because detainees can be transferred between North and South the development of an identical strategy is crucial.

In addition, international cooperation needs to be reinforced. After all, radicalization in prisons is not an exclusively Belgian issue. Other countries have also undertaken various attempts to tackle the issue. That know-how should be recognized and integrated in Belgian initiatives concerning the same issue. An active participation in the European Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is the ideal means for that. The RAN is a discussion platform created by the European Commission that consists of first-line workers that all have experience with the approach of radicalization in different sectors. In many working groups, experience, knowledge and good practices are exchanged. The GD PI, the State Security Service and the CUTA participate in the working group "prison and probation" and will continue to actively participate in the future.

In the framework of the European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services (EuroPris), a European NGO created in 2011, the necessary attention will be given to the issue and the approach of radicalization in the course of 2015. In that network, the general directors of all EuroPris members regularly consult with each other. That proves that there is a need for discussion about a common strategy to tackle radicalization in prisons at the European level. The European commissioner for Justice, Vera Jourova, will broach the issue in the coming months.

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